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"HIDDEN GOLD" IN THE BLUE SKY LAWS
by
J. B. Wolens"
E VERYONE is familiar with the proverbial "pot of gold at the
end of the rainbow"; however, judging from the paucity of re-
ported cases, not many "potential" litigants or their counsel are cog-
nizant of the latent opportunities presented by the blue sky laws and
court decisions thereunder which could mean recoupment of what
would otherwise be a substantial investment loss. I speak advisedly of
the "paucity of reported cases." There is no practical way to deter-
mine, in fact, how many suits are brought under state blue sky law
civil liability sections and settled either prior to or after judgment
in the trial court.1 Hence, it is conceivable that investors in fact have
discovered more hidden gold in the blue sky laws than one would
imagine from reading the reported decisions.! It is my purpose to
explore the civil liability cases which have been brought not against
those knowingly and wilfully violating blue sky law provisions but
rather against those persons on the periphery of the transaction who
have subsequently been held liable as a participant therein.
Let us construct a little drama of our own. Mr. B.I.G. Plunger,
a substantial and seasoned investor in the security markets, purchases
an unregistered security in No Chance Electronics, Inc. No Chance
looks reasonably good on paper and has several government contracts
pending which could mean substantial business and profits. No Chance
prospers; the value of its stock soars; Mr. Plunger would not think
of selling his shares of No Chance stock; and all parties to the illegal
transaction are delighted with their deal-for a time. Then succes-
sive bad deals cause a reversal of No Chance's prior good fortune.
The corporation has trouble meeting its government contracts and
loses money on them; the value of its stock plummets; and Mr. Plun-
ger begins to have grave reservations concerning the wisdom of his
purchase. To compound the problem, the man from whom Mr. Plun-
ger purchased the No Chance stock is no longer in the country, and
No Chance commences bankruptcy proceedings. However, our little
drama could have a happy ending for its leading man. Mr. Plunger
* Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University; B.A., Rice University;
LL.B., Southern Methodist University.
'As Professor Louis Loss has written, "the vice of studying litigation on the basis of
formal adjudications is all too apparent: the curtain is rung down on many of these little
dramas long before the last act, and none can tell what finally happened at trial or by
way of settlement." Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATIONS 1689 (temp. student ed. 1961).
Other possible explanations for case scarcity are suggested in the "Conclusion," infra.
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still might emerge unscathed from the transaction by consulting an
attorney well versed in the blue sky laws, Mr. I. M. Smart.
Mr. Smart might advise our now sadder but wiser Mr. Plunger
that all is not lost. Mr. Plunger may yet recover his invested capital,
and conceivably he can recover up to double such amount plus inter-
est on the purchase price (which will earn a handsome fee for Mr.
Smart). Not a bad day's work for what was otherwise a very poor
investment.!
To determine how this apparently benevolent turn of events (for
Messrs. Plunger and Smart, at least) is possible, we turn to the other
side of the coin. The money that flows into the pockets of our heroes
must come from somewhere; all good little dramas must have their
villains. In this instance such label may be pinned on an unwary, but
wealthy, officer or director of No Chance or conceivably, a similarly
well-fixed "link in the chain" of the sale of No Chance shares to Mr.
Plunger. Fraudulent activity of a person involved in such sale is be-
yond the scope of our inquiry, as his liability reasonably could be
predicted either under an appropriate securities statute or at common
law (tort liability). Rather, we shall inquire into the strange and
seemingly incongruous liabilities incurred by virtue of official capac-
ity or good samaritanism and which can result under statutory lan-
guage or judicial gloss thereon.
It is assumed that the stock being considered has been sold in
violation of one or more provisions of a given blue sky law. The
violation may arise because of an assumed exemption from registra-
tion which fails, such as the private offering exemption, where it is
proven subsequently that the stock was offered to more than the
limited number specified in the exemption. Or the violation may re-
sult simply from lack of knowledge on the part of the issuer and its
counsel that registration was required. A glance at the Uniform
Securities Act indicates the numerous ways in which civil liability
may be incurred. For example, under the Uniform Securities Act"
civil liability arises when a person offers or sells a security in violation
of the act's provision making it unlawful for him (1) to transact
business as a broker-dealer or agent unless registered under the act;'
(2) to offer or sell a security not registered under the act unless the
'Hopefully, the little drama evolved herein will not imply that a market-seasoned in-
vestor would invest in fact in the unregistered securities of such an unseasoned company as
No Chance. It must be understood that this is an atypical situation, constructed solely to
illustrate what in the writer's opinion is possible under present law and court decisions. It is
not intimated that actual situations will occur with any frequency where this result would
be possible.
' UNIFORM SECURiTES ACT § 410(a). As an example of the exemplary damages available
for willful violation see The Texas Securities Act, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 581-33.
'UNIFORM SEcuRrrEs ACT § 201 (a).
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security or transaction is exempt;' (3) to represent that the regis-
tration of the security means that the statements made in the regis-
tration are true and not misleading or that approval of the security
constitutes a recommendation or determination of the merits of the
investment;7 (4) to use sales literature before it is affirmatively ap-
proved;' (5) to make such sale without the use of a prospectus when
required;9 (6) to violate the terms of stock or proved escrow agree-
ments required by the administrator pursuant to the act;"0 and (7) to
use a form or contract for sale other than the one prescribed by the
administrator as permitted under the act."1 In addition, of course,
civil liability can arise where a security is sold or offered for sale by
means of an untrue statement or omission which in effect is material
and fraudulent and misleading to the purchaser."2
More particularly in point for the purposes of this discussion is the
act's provision making every person controlling the seller; every part-
ner, officer, director or employee of the seller; and every broker-
dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale jointly and severally
liable with and to the same extent as the seller unless such person
sustains the burden of proof that he did not know and in the exercise
of reasonable care could not have known of the facts upon which his
liability is predicated."2 This is the section of the uniform act which
is directed to those herein labeled as the persons "peripherally liable."
One must be hesitant in drawing any conclusions based upon ju-
dicial decisions of more than one state and even of the same state
where different statutory requirements are involved. However, if any
relatively meaningful conclusions are to be drawn, some classification
within the varying statutory format must be attempted.
As indicated above, civil liability for a securities sale results from
a violation of the registration, licensing, or fraud provisions of a blue
sky law (or federal security act) and/or regulations thereunder.
I. STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF BLUE SKY LAWS
A. No Civil Liability Section-Illegality As Basis For Liability
Some courts have found civil liability in this peripheral area of an
illegal security sale even under a statute which does not purport to
' UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 301.
7 UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 405(a), 405(b).
a UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 5 403.
'UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 5 304(d).
1UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 305 (g).
1 UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 305(h).
1UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 5 410(a) (2).
'3UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 5 410(b).
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impose any civil liability upon anyone. Statutes of this type are found
in varying form. The blue sky laws of Minnesota and Nebraska in
effect provide only criminal penalties for violations.'4 The California
act declares simply, "Every security of its own issue sold or issued by
any company without a permit of the commissioner then in effect
authorizing the issuance or sale of the security is void."" The ra-
tionale for civil liability of persons peripherally connected with such
sales under these statutes normally proceeds with the premise that any
sale in violation of a penal statute is void (as is expressly stated in the
California act). Furthermore, a principal violating the statute com-
mits a criminal act for which he and all his accomplices are liable to
the state. From this criminal liability the courts then impose remedial
civil liability not only upon the principal but also upon his accom-
plices because they all are co-conspirators under the penal statutes
of the state."
B. Civil Liability Section-Persons Liable Expressly Named In Statute
The majority of the blue sky laws do impose civil liability upon
certain classes of persons. Such statutes vary substantially in format
but may be generalized by the form of the Ohio provision which
reads, "Every sale or contract for sale made in violation of [appropri-
ate sections of this act] . . . is voidable at the election of the pur-
chaser. The person making such sale or contract for sale, and every
person who has participated in or aided the seller in any way in mak-
ing such sale or contract for sale, are jointly and severally liable to
such purchaser."'" Though similar in format to the Ohio provision,
the statutes of Iowa and Oregon purport to predicate such liability
upon personal participation and knowledge of the violation. Finally,
there are those states which have now adopted the Uniform Securities
Act with various modifications." Blue sky law liability provisions as
classified above represent the present laws of the specified jurisdictions
which are culminations of statutory development in this area for each
such state. 9
14MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80.37(1) (1946); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81.333 (1943).
"CAL. CORPS. CODE § 26100.
6Mary Pickford Co. v. Bayly Bros., 12 Cal.2d 501, 86 P.2d 102 (1939); Noll v. Woods,
231 Mich. 224, 203 N.W. 848 (1925); and cases cited in notes 40-44, infra.
'7 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43. Also applicable are those of Georgia, Illinois, and
Florida.
" States in this final category which are considered herein and have now adopted the
Uniform Securities Act in more or less standard form are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,
Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New
Jersey, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia and Washington. 9 C. UNIFORM LAWS
ANN. (1965 Supp.).
" It must be recognized that the statutory schemes as classified herein represent the




Consider now the court development under language analogous
to that of the Ohio act which makes the illegal sale voidable and every
person who has participated or aided in the sale jointly and severally
liable to the purchaser.
II. PARTICIPATING AND AIDING
A. Agents
1. Civil Liability Where Agency for the Seller Is Established It
should be noted at the outset that normally the person selling a secur-
ity in violation of a blue sky law is liable to the purchaser. Statutes
which expressly set forth liability for officers, directors, and agents
usually require that these parties be legally related to the seller before
there is civil liability to the purchaser. The thrust of the majority of
the blue sky laws, then, is toward the person who sells in violation of
the act rather than just the issuer thereof; and unlike the federal acts
in no instance is an attempt made to regulate the purchaser of the
security.
In the early case of Lewis v. Bricker,2 the Michigan court held
the defendant liable because of his "assistance" in selling unregistered
securities. The facts disclosed that the defendant was simply a good
samaritan who became ensnared by introducing the plaintiff to men
selling the stock of an Ohio company. The introduction was made in
Michigan. The defendant invited the plaintiff to go to Cleveland to
look at the company. The defendant was present but apparently did
not take part when the salesmen made their pitch in Michigan. He
did accompany the plaintiff on the Cleveland trip, paying for a din-
ner along the way. The sale was actually consummated in Ohio. The
Michigan statute in force at that time made it unlawful for any
company or representative thereof to sell or in any manner negotiate
for the sale of an unapproved security. The Ohio company's stock
had not been approved in Michigan, and hence the Michigan statute
was violated. In holding the defendant civilly liable, the court found
it was unnecessary to show that the defendant had made representa-
tions as to the stock itself or that his actions had been a procuring
cause of the sale. It was sufficient that the defendant's activity had
assisted in the unlawful enterprise and that a part of such assistance
had taken place in Michigan. By virtue of his actions, the good samar-
itan was made a representative and agent of the Ohio company
(albeit unauthorized) and a participant in the sale.
Again in Michigan, the court found that a trustee of a real estate
20235 Mich. 656, 209 N.W. 832 (1926).
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syndicate, by accepting purchase payments for participating interests
therein and acting as trustee of the syndicate, had joined with the
promoters in carrying out the enterprise and was chargeable with
knowledge of the fact that such interests were not registered as
required by the Michigan Blue Sky Law. It made no difference what-
ever that the trustee did not actually profit from such activity."'
In Cleland v. Smart under an unusual fact situation a corporate
president was held to be a selling agent.2 The defendant was intro-
duced to the plaintiff by the company's secretary. Several days after
such introduction, the defendant wrote the plaintiff advising her that
she had been "nominated and voted on unanimously for membership
in the corporation." Such letter further advised the plaintiff that cer-
tain shares of stock had been reserved for her and welcomed her
"into the organization." The court held that such letter constituted
an active inducement and persuasion intended to cause plaintiff to
complete the purchase of the shares of stock. Though the defendant
purported to act only as president of the company, such fact did not
insulate him individually from being held a selling agent of the
company.
In another instance a plaintiff's own regular attorney who rec-
ommended the purchase of securities in a company in which the at-
torney was an officer and director was held to have been such an active
participant in the ultimate sale of such stock to the plaintiff so as to
render the attorney civilly liable under the California act.'
In the Oregon case of Adamson v. Lang" the court held a creditor
liable to purchasers of securities for lending money to an officer of
the selling corporation. The court held the creditor knew (or should
have known) that the funds so loaned were to be used by the cor-
poration to avoid an escrow requirement of the Oregon Corporation
Commissioner. The loaned funds were used to purchase sufficient
shares to meet the escrow requirements, and the subsequently re-
leased escrowed funds were used by the corporation to pay off its
officer's debt. The court held that the statutory language, which re-
ferred only to persons making the sale, was sufficiently broad to
include any person who aids another in making the sale.
The agency concept of participation was probably carried to its
extreme in the Texas case of Brown v. Cole." The facts showed that
" Freeze v. Smith, 254 Mich. 386, 236 N.W. 810 (1931). See also under analogous
facts Frenzel v. Lonnquist Co., 304 Ill. App. 377, 26 N.E.2d 687 (Ill. Civ. App. 1940).
22 321 Mich. 46, 32 N.W.2d 42 (1948).
'a Strangman v. Arc Saws, Inc., 123 Cal. App. 2d 620, 267 P.2d 395 (Dist. Ct. 1954).
24236 Ore. 511, 389 P.2d 39 (1964).
21 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704 (1956).
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the defendant Brown approached one Gould with information con-
cerning a venture which contemplated a loan by Brown and others.
Those participating in the loan were to receive, proportionately, all
the shares of a Mexican corporation which, in turn, owned a quarter
interest in certain Mexican mining properties. It was Gould who
initially advised and discussed this matter with the plaintiff. The
plaintiff, not being satisfied with the representations made to him by
Gould, sent his auditor to visit the mining site itself. The defendant
Brown planned and paid the expenses for the trip. Payments for the
security interest were made to Brown as agent per Brown's instruc-
tions. A letter written by Brown acknowledged receipt of the pay-
ment and plaintiff's participation in the venture. The court, in hold-
ing Brown liable, found that there need not be only one seller in a
given transaction. "Clearly there may be more than one [seller]. As
we interpret the Act [Texas Blue Sky Law] the seller may be any
link in the chain of the selling process or in the words of the Act he is
one who performs 'any act by which a sale is made.' ....
The court recognized that Brown had acted as the agent for the
purchasers at a certain stage in the transaction and by virtue of such
activity alone could not be liable to the purchasers under the Texas
act. Nevertheless, the court stated that Brown also had acted as an
agent for the seller at the instant the sale of the unregistered securities
was made:
Granting that Brown was the agent of respondents [Cole and Gould],
as he must have been in the transmittal of the funds to Cain, that was
only a part of and resulted from dealings had theretofore with respond-
ents. The respondents had agreed to participate in the deal prior to the
time that the letters of acknowledgment were written. Petitioner could
not, by designating himself as agent, escape his responsibility for the
negotiations with Gould and Cole leading up to their purchase.7
The court founded participation by Brown on his following ac-
tivities: (1) initially discussing the proposal with the plaintiff; (2)
writing Gould further information in regard thereto; (3) displaying
letters relative to such transaction to plaintiff's auditor; (4) writing
further details concerning the venture; (5) making the trip to Mex-
ico at his own expense; and (6) giving instructions as to how the
checks were to be made and money remitted."s
26 Id. at 708. (Emphasis added.)
27 Id. at 708-709. (Emphasis added.)
" It should be noted that the court rejected the defense of joint venture which is
somewhat analogous to cases discussed hereinafter where the courts have found that those
who participate in the initial formation of a business venture stand on "equal footing"
with all others so participating and hence there is no civil liability between them. Brown v.
Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704 (1956).
[Vol. 20:578
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2. No Liability Where No Agency for the Seller Is Established A
comparison of cases from other jurisdictions with the foregoing runs
the hazard of contrasting cases decided under differing statutory
schemes. With this initial caveat, which may be unnecessary in view
of the extremely limited amount of participation allowed within any
jursidiction, consider the following limited instances in which poten-
tial "agents" were found to have no liability.
It could be presumed that the official designated by a particular
blue sky law to issue the permit authorizing the sale of securities
within the jurisdiction incurs no liability for the issuance of such
permit. In the only case found on the subject, the South Carolina
court denied such liability relying upon the legend, which was re-
quired by statute to be printed upon the face of the Commissioner's
certificate to the effect that the certificate was not to be construed as
a recommendation of the security for purchase. 9
Likewise, it has been held that under a statute imposing liability
on anyone who shall have personally "aided in any way in making
the sale" a bank which was used to deposit sales proceeds and which
was named in sales literature was not liable to a purchaser of unreg-
istered securities.30
In two companion cases under an Oklahoma statute making sales
voidable at the election of the purchaser, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court found that the bank, acting as registrar of stock whose sole
duty was to register any certificate of stock in the corporation upon
presentation to it by the transfer agent, was not liable to the pur-
chasers thereof. In one case the court reasoned that there was no
duty upon the bank to ascertain any information from the corpora-
tion other than the number of shares originally authorized and the
number then outstanding. The registration of the certificate was held
to imply nothing more than that it was within the limits authorized
by the corporate charter." In the other case, the court, under the
statutory definition of an "agent" as a "salesman," decided that since
9 Minter v. McSwain, 126 S.C. 371, 119 S.E. 901 (1923).
09 If it be assumed . . . that the bank was aware that . . . prospective purchasers
were being asked to send their checks made payable to the bank, this is not
enough to establish an agency. Nor does the willingness of a bank to become
the depository of funds amount to a personal participation or an aid in making
the sale. The Supreme Court of Florida has held that the statutory language
.... 'implies some activity in inducing the purchaser to invest.' Nicholas v.
Yandre, 151 Fla. 87, 9 So. 2d 157, 160 . . . the permission of the bank,
whether express or tacit to the use of its name was not part of the taking of
an active part in influencing the appellant to purchase.
Sorenason v. Elrod, 286 F.2d 72, 74 (5th Cir. 1960). (Emphasis added.)
" Dunham v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co., 180 Okla. 534, 71 P.2d 468 (1937). Note
that this case was decided under a 1921 statute, which has been repealed, and is not to be




a corporation was not a natural person it could not be a "salesman"
within the meaning of the act, and therefore could not personally
participate or aid in making a sale. Dicta in such opinion also tended
to show that the Oklahoma court placed some reliance upon the
knowledge of the participant of the violation, or, alternatively, at
least required circumstances which imposed upon the participant a
duty to learn of the violation."2
3. No Liability Where Agency Is for Purchaser Only One of the
major contentions of the defendant in the Brown case was that he
acted as an agent for the purchaser in acquiring the security. As
noted above, the Texas court rejected such contention, holding that
while the defendant acted generally as an agent for the purchaser,
in one instance he nevertheless acted for the seller. Some instances
are found where liability has been denied because sales were con-
summated by a person (in most instances a broker-dealer) acting
solely as an agent for the purchaser. As noted, none of the blue sky
laws herein considered attempt to regulate purchasers or the pur-
chase of a security as distinguished from the federal statutes which
purport to regulate both buyers and sellers. In a typical case a stock
broker executing an unsolicited order for a security which was not
registered within the jurisdiction was not held liable in part because
throughout the transaction the broker had acted as agent for the pur-
chaser, and at no time had he bought or sold for his own account.3
Similarly, an Illinois court in Weisbrod v. Lowitz3 ' found the de-
fendant stock broker not liable to the plaintiff on the theory that
the broker had acted solely as an agent for the buyer and the actual
sellers of the security were the undisclosed principals of the New
York brokers who had made the sale to the defendants on the floor
of the New York Exchange. It was not determinative that the de-
fendant's salesman advised the plaintiff that the stock was a "good
buy," because the plaintiff was seeking such information at the time.
The court took pains to distinguish the situation from those where a
defendant broker would actively solicit a purchaser to buy a specific
security or where a broker would buy for his own account and then
resell at a profit without charging the purchaser a fee. This latter
situation did in fact result in broker liability where, instead of acting
as an agent for the purchaser of the security and charging a commis-
sion thereon, the broker had purchased the security and then had
2"The theory of the bank's liability is dispelled by the absence of any proof of scienter
and the admitted and obvious fact that it was not a natural person." Braniff v. Coffield,
199 Okla. 604, 190 P.2d 815, 820 (1947).
" Fine v. Bradford, 136 S.E.2d 147 (Ga. Civ. App. 1964).
a4282 Ill. App. 252 (1935).
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resold it, making a profit on the resale."s Thus, in the area of broker-
client relations some guidelines may be drawn on the basis of non-
solicitation and a commission charge.
4. No Liability Between Co-Organizers Though the problem of
registration requirements for pre-incorporation subscriptions is beyond
the scope of this Article, nevertheless it is necessary to mention at least
briefly the problems necessarily involved where a party is induced to
invest in a business which has not yet been organized. This was in
part the problem of the Brown case," where the contention of joint
venture in the business formation was rejected by the Texas court.
The states are divided as to whether or not such subscriptions should
be registered and therefore subject to civil liability penalties. Findings
of no liability have been predicated upon the fact that no method for
registering pre-organization subscriptions has been provided by the
statutes under consideration. (This may even be true where the term
"security" is defined by the act to include pre-organization subscrip-
tions.) Other theories for nonliability emphasize that all those initial-
ly forming the organization are equally responsible for complying
with the blue sky laws and, to the extent such laws are violated, the
parties are considered to be in pari delicto.
A plaintiff who was involved in all initial discussions and organ-
izational meetings of a corporation being formed to continue an exist-
ing poultry business and who subsequently signed the articles as an
original subscriber was not permitted to recover against his co-
incorporators." The court buttressed its holding by finding upon both
theories of non-liability-that is, there was no provision in the state's
law requiring registration, and, further, each co-subscriber was equal-
ly obligated to register the security if such were required."
In another case the defendants actually solicited the plaintiffs to
join in the business venture and to take an active part therein. The
plaintiff proposed the corporate form and engaged in all meetings
" Taft v. Otte & Co., 274 I11. App. 280 (1934).
asBrown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704 (1956).
a Guynn v. Shulters, 223 Miss. 232, 78 So.2d 114 (1955).
" In Watkins v. Public Serv. Life & Accident Co., 188 Wash. 280, 62 P.2d
464, at 465, the court said, "here, the respondent's services were rendered as
a step in the creation or organization of a corporation. He produced sub-
scriptions to the capital stock, . . . his services were all rendered prior to the
time that the prospective corporation could legally issue securities, the sale and
disposition of which would be regulated by the Securities Act." In Gannon v.
Grayson Water Co., 254 Ky. 251, 71 S.W.2d 433, at 434, the court said:
'though the act provides that "security" shall include "pre-organization sub-
scriptions", it is at once apparent that, when subscriptions are taken prior to
filing of articles of incorporation, no method is provided for the registration
of such subscriptions.'
Id. at 110. (Emphasis added.)
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leading up to the actual incorporation. The plaintiff signed one set of
articles as an incorporator (though such articles were rejected by the
Secretary of State and a new set was filed which the plaintiff did not
sign). Plaintiff accepted positions as secretary-treasurer and director
of the corporation. The California court held that all of the parties
stood on an "equal footing" as entrepreneurs of the business and that
there was no reason why the defendants should reimburse the plain-
tiff for his loss when the business became insolvent.a9
Some guidelines may be possible in this area of pre-incorporation
subscriptions. Barring a statutory requirement of registration, no
registration should normally be required where the parties in the
creation of the business invest or agree to invest therein. Once the busi-
ness has been legally formed, other problems arise; and certainly the
safest course then is to register.
B. Officers And Directors
1. Liability Under Common Law-Criminality of Act as Basis As
seen in the Cleland case,40 officers and directors have often been sub-
jected to personal liability despite their protests that they acted only
in an official corporate capacity. Liability has been predicted upon
various theories which may be loosely classified under common law
concepts or statutory language. Common law concepts may further
be subdivided by the theories upon which liability is predicated. One
such theory holds that officers and directors participating in a sale
which is made illegal under the statutes of the jurisdiction are co-
conspirators under the penal statutes of the state and, as such, are
liable to the same extent as would be a principal. Most such statutes
impose civil liability upon the seller, and the courts reason that co-
conspirators violating a criminal statute are civilly liable as would be
the principal.4 Common law liability also has been predicated upon
an implied representation by the officers and directors of the issuer
that the security sold is properly issued, that is, that a permit or
registration has been obtained therefor. Where such is not the case,
there is a negligent misrepresentation which is actionable fraud at
common law for which all participating persons are liable.2
We should distinguish at the outset those cases involving officers
and directors who, knowingly and intentionally, perpetrate a fraud
upon the prospective or actual purchaser of an unregistered security
" Holmberg v. Marsden, 39 Cal. 2d 592, 248 P.2d 417 (1952). Compare Smith v.
Turner, 47 Cal. Rep. 582 (Dist. Ct. 1965).
40 See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
4'Noll v. Woods, 231 Mich. 224, 203 N.W. 848 (1925).
42 Gormly v. Dickinson, 179 Cal. App. 2d 92, 2 Cal. Rep. 650 (Dist. Ct. 1960).
[Vol. 20:578
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and those cases where officials are the actual "salesmen" of the secur-
ity. Such cases are not within the scope of this discussion which con-
centrates only upon officer-director liability based upon implied
knowledge by virtue of official duties or position in the corporate
seller.
The Michigan Supreme Court, in holding a corporate president civ-
illy liable even prior to its present blue sky law, relied upon a penal
statute which made it unlawful for any investment company or rep-
resentative thereof to negotiate in any manner for the sale of an
unregistered security. The court determined that a civil action to
recover money was not based on fraud but rather upon the fact that
a sale made in violation of a penal statute is void, and that all persons
aiding and assisting in the commission of such violation are prin-
cipals. Thus, where the defendant aided in the purchase of unregist-
ered securities in a company in which he was president and signed
the certificate for the shares so purchased, he was liable to the pur-
chaser for having assisted those who sold the security-regardless
of whether or not he personally profited by such sale.'
In the above case the securities, though previously sold, were not
issued until after the approval of the Michigan Security Commissioner
had been obtained. The court held that the illegal sale was not vitiated
by the approval. To like effect is the ruling of the California court:
This illegality [criminal penalties for violation of the Securities Act]
infects the final act in the transaction, the issuance of the shares of
stock, even though that act occurs after the issuance of a state per-
mit . .. It is the validity of the sale, not the validity of the shares or
their issuance, which is the crucial question. The collection of the
money, a significant part of a sale for value ... occurred at a time when
there could be no legal sale."
2. Liability Under Common Law-Implied Misrepresentation as
Basis Under general corporate law, a corporate director or officer
may not profit at the expense of the corporation, and where such
officials actively participate in a fraud which results in a loss to pur-
chasing shareholders, such shareholders may rescind the transaction."
Some jurisdictions however, would hold that silence alone will not
render a director liable to a prospective purchaser. For example, a
director was held not liable where his sole activity was approval of
a prospectus which omitted a material fact and where the plaintiff
43 See note 16 supra. More recent Michigan cases have reached similar results under
various versions of the "standard liability provision." See Nelson v. O'Dell, 335 Mich. 50,
55 N.W.2d 723 (1952); Veenstra v. Associated Broadcasting Corp., 321 Mich. 679, 33
N.W.2d 115 (1948). Accord, Mosley v. Unruh, 150 Kan. 469, 95 P.2d 537 (1939).
"Randall v. Beber, 107 Cal. App. 2d 692, 237 P.2d 994, 999 (Dist. Ct. 1951).
4 Holloway v. Osteograf Co., 240 Ala. 507, 200 So. 197 (1941).
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did not prove that there was fraudulent concealment on the part of
the director."
The theory upon which officer-director liability often is predicated
was probably most succinctly stated by the California court in Gorm-
ly v. Dickinson,"' where the court buttressed its holding under the
illegal sale theory with a concurrent holding upon the actionable
fraud theory in the following language:
While it has long been settled that the purchaser of securities issued in
violation of the Corporate Securities Law may recover in an action for
money had and received on the theory that the sale and the securities
are void, [citations omitted] . . . it is also the law that a person who
sells a security impliedly represents that a permit therefor has been
secured when one is required by law for such a sale, and if this implied
representation is false, then it is a negligent misrepresentation which is
actionable fraud ... and, where, as here, the action is for damages for
fraud, recovery may be had against all persons participating in the
fraud, whether they receive a portion of the money paid or not.48
The Nebraska court in the case of Davis v. Walker," in effect held
its local blue sky law inapplicable to officers and directors but nev-
ertheless held such officers and directors liable under the common law
responsibilities and duties of corporate officers and directors stating
that a corporation must act through individuals who are chargeable
with knowledge of the law." Though the Nebraska court did not feel
constrained to rely upon the terms of its statutes which purport to
make any person selling a security in violation of the statute liable,
there is authority to sustain the proposition that such statutory lan-
guage is sufficiently broad to include officers and directors of a com-
pany selling unregistered securities in violation of a local blue sky
law."1
3. Liability Under Statute-Officers and Directors Generically
"Lovell v. Smith, 232 Ala. 626, 169 So. 280 (1936).
47 179 Cal. App. 2d 92, 2 Cal Rep. 650 (Dist. Ct. 1960).
48 Id. at 656. (Emphasis added.) Accord, Elzarian v. Wiser, 216 Cal. App. 2d 506, 31
Cal. Rep. 126 (Dist. Ct. 1963); Adkins v. Wyckoff, 152 Cal. App. 2d 131, 313 P.2d 592
(Dist. Ct. 1957); Ogier v. Pacific Oil & Gas Dev. Corp., 132 Cal. App. 2d 496, 282 P.2d
574 (Dist. Ct. 1955); Taormina v. Antelope Mining Corp., 110 Cal. App. 2d 314, 242
P.2d 665 (Dist. Ct. 1952).
41 170 Neb. 891, 104 N.W.2d 479 (1960).
50 [A] corporation has no thought or will of its own, and its every act is the act
of those individuals who are running it; that where the duty of knowing
facts exist, ignorance due to neglect of duty on the part of a director creates
the same liability as actual knowledge and a failure to act thereon; and that
where fraud is committed by a corporation, which is the situation in the case
at bar, it is time to disregard the corporate fiction and hold the persons re-
sponsible therefor in their individual capacities.
Davis v. Walker, supra note 49, at 489.
A' Miller v. Griffith, 28 Ohio App. 2d 278, 196 N.E.2d 154 (1961).
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Named As noted, a majority of the blue sky laws purport in one
way or another to make all persons selling securities in violation of
their provisions jointly and severally liable to the purchasers thereof.
These statutes take various forms, but most are couched in terms
which make any sale in violation of the statute voidable at the election
of the purchaser. Most statutes also subject any person who sells or
participates in such sale to joint and several liability to the purchaser.
Despite differences in statutory language, court decisions have brought
the various statutory forms into very close accord when measured
by the results achieved. Thus, even though a statute may speak in
terms of "any person" and may not expressly name officers or direc-
tors of the corporate seller as persons civilly liable, the courts have
had no difficulty in holding an officer or director liable to the pur-
chaser though the officer's or director's participation may have been
only in his official capacity.
Our inquiry then must turn to a consideration of what facts have,
or have not, been deemed sufficient to hold an officer and/or director
of a corporation personally liable to a purchaser of securities sold in
violation of the local blue sky law. It is assumed that in all instances
the officer and/or director is not the motivating factor in such sale
but rather incurs such liability because of some peripheral participa-
tion therein. Again, note the basic assumption that there has been a
violation of the local blue sky law so as to bring the civil liability
provisions into effect.
Certainly we will have no difficulty in finding participation where
a corporate officer: (1) was in sole charge of the only corporate
office which was maintained in his building; (2) took reports of the
salesmen authorized by the corporation to sell its unregistered secur-
ities; (3) deposited proceeds from such sales in the company account;
(4) paid commission to the salesmen on such sales; (5) signed the
certificates issued pursuant to such sales in his official capacity; (6)
permitted sales to be conducted in his presence; and (7) wrote letters
to prospects recommending investments in the company." The prob-
lem becomes one of determining how few of these criteria may be
involved without releasing, as it were, the officer or director from
liability as a participant. Remembering that all generalizations are
subect to exceptions, one may conclude that the chances are very
good that an officer or director will be held civilly liable to a pur-
chaser where there is any degree of participation by such officer or
director in an illegal sale.
Under a statute purporting to make all sales in violation of the
"Drees v. Minnesota Petroleum Co., 189 Minn. 608, 250 N.W. 563 (1933).
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statute voidable and "all actively engaged in making such sales"
liable to the purchaser, the Michigan Supreme Court has held that
recommending the purchase, accepting checks for the purchase
price, and signing the stock certificates as president of the company
is sufficient participation to render a corporate president liable to the
purchaser."
The Michigan court went further in the somewhat strange fact
situation presented in Cleland v. Smart," where the court apparent-
ly held that the writing of a letter by the corporate president to a
prospective purchaser stating that such prospective purchaser had
been "nominated and voted on unanimously for membership" and
advising the purchaser that stock had been reserved in her name was
sufficient participation in the resulting sale to render the president
liable thereon."
Some courts have been tempted to draw a distinction between the
actual sales transaction as consummated between purchaser and seller
and the ministerial or official duties of a corporate officer in the issu-
ance of the share certificate. Thus, the Utah Supreme Court found
no liability in Willis v. Spring Canyon Copper Co., " where the sec-
retary of the corporation accepted the purchase price and signed the
certificate for the shares as secretary of the corporation. The court
concluded that the sale was complete upon payment to the authorized
salesman and became binding at that time before the certificate was
issued, "as evidenced by daily stock brokers' transaction." The court
added:
The receipt of the money by [the corporate secretary] . . . and his sign-
ing of the certificate, being acts unnecessary to complete the sale, the
only fact called to our attention ... that might point to ... [the secre-
tary's] participation in the sale, was his vote for the resolution giving
the agent . . . authority to sell the stock-a fact we have held would
not constitute participation or aiding in the sale under the statute
where otherwise it appeared that the officer approving the resolution
took no active part in effecting the sale.17
The concurring opinion stressed that such acts are only ministerial
and do not establish the officer as a participant in the sale of unreg-
istered securities.
The Kansas Supreme Court reached an opposite result in Daniels
" Chambers v. Beckwith, 247 Mich. 255, 225 N.W. 605 (1929). Accord, Ferar v. Hall,
330 Mich. 214, 47 N.W.2d 79 (1951).
54 321 Mich. 46, 32 N.W.2d 42 (1948). See also note 22 supra and accompanying text.
" As noted previously, however, such liability was predicated as much on the activity
alone as on the fact that it was performed by the corporate president.
564 Utah 2d 211, 291 P.2d 878 (1956).
57 Id. at 879. (Emphasis added.)
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v. Craiglow,s holding that a corporate officer who received the pur-
chase payment for unregistered corporate shares and who subse-
quently signed such certificate and mailed it to the purchaser was
liable thereon as a participant in such transaction.59 It may be noted
that the Kansas court reinforced its rejection of the "ministerial
duty" theory by relying also upon the implied misrepresentation doc-
trine in that through authenticating and issuing the share certificates
the president and secretary represented that the sale was not "tainted
with illegality," by failing to procure a blue sky permit."
Directors have been held to have personally aided in sales of un-
registered securities by permitting or knowingly not objecting to the
use of their names, pictures, and financial statements in various forms
of advertising literature used by corporate agents in selling unreg-
istered securities. 1 The most strained interpretation of "participation"
may have been adopted by those courts which have held a corporate
president liable for doing nothing more than signing the share certi-
ficates in his official capacity as president. 2
4. Liability Under Statute-Officers and Directors Expressly Named
An interesting situation arose under an Oregon statute which pur-
ported to make an officer or director of the selling corporation liable
if he personally participated in making the sale with knowledge of the
violation.3 Two of four directors were actively involved in the sale
of the corporation's unregistered securities. The other two participated
only indirectly in that one supplied the selling literature prepared by
others and the other examined proofs of the sales literature and ap-
proved the contents. The Oregon Supreme Court held that sufficient
"knowledge" was established with respect to the latter directors by
proof that they knew the security was unregistered. It was unneces-
sary to prove, in addition, that they knew the law required the secur-
ity to be registered." Thus the court effectively evaded the express
statutory requirement of knowledge.
Further judicial extensions of statutory language may be seen
5 131 Kan. 500, 292 P. 771 (1930).
"[P]ayment of price and issuance of share certificate are normal concomitants of a
sale of shares. . . Plaintiff could not enjoy to the full extent all her privileges as a share-
holder until she received a share certificate. The share certificates she did receive were the
tangible evidence of what she bought, and her transaction with the company took the
form of payment of price followed by symbolical delivery. The treasurer received the
money, and the president and secretary made the delivery." Id. at 772-73. (Emphasis added.)
60 For a more recent Kansas decision, see Dalton v. Lawrence Nat'l Bank, 169 Kan. 401
219 P.2d 719 (1950).
"
5 Braniff v. Coflield, 199 Okla. 604, 190 P.2d 815 (1947).
"
5Miller v. Griffith, 28 Ohio App. 2d 278, 196 N.E. 154 (C.P. 1961).
OE. REv. STAT. § 59.250(1).
"Spears v. Lawrence Sec., Inc., 399 P.2d 348 (Ore. 1965).
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in Harper v. Tri-State Motors, Inc.5 Under a statute apparently
requiring officer/director participation to establish liability for an
illegal sale, the Utah Supreme Court first espoused the doctrine of
participation, then reached the position that an officer or director is
virtually liable per se:
He [the corporate president] cannot be held liable merely because he
happened to be president of the corporation at the time, or because he
signed the stock certificate which Richards delivered to the purchaser,
or because he proposed and voted for the resolution passed by the board
of directors ...under which Richards claimed to act, nor because of
all of these things. These facts if not explained ...might well be re-
garded ... as evidence proving that he did have some part in the trans-
action. The fact that he signed the stock certficate is alone strong evi-
dence to that effect, and in the absence of other proof might be suffi-
cient to support a finding against him."
On the other hand, the Colorado Supreme Court determined that
the signing of the stock certificate by the corporate secretary was a
ministerial duty by which the secretary merely attested to the presi-
dent's signature. Such activity did not constitute participation by
the secretary in the sale of shares represented thereby."'
The Florida Supreme Court concluded that directors who voted
to affirm a sale previously concluded had not participated therein so
as to render them personally liable since "the language [of the
statute] implied some activity in inducing the purchaser to invest.""5
The Alabama court also held that a director who voted only as to
the disposition of the purchase price (in this case the sale of liberty
bonds received in exchange for unregistered corporate securities) was
not personally liable for participating in the illegal sale which gave
rise to such proceeds. The court likened such action to that of a cor-
porate treasurer who deposits cash received for the sale of unregistered
securities, implying thereby that the treasurer would not be liable in
such instance. 9 The Oklahoma Supreme Court now is in substantial
agreement with the majority view that officers and directors of the
selling corporation are civilly liable to the purchasers of unregistered
securities under the terms of Oklahoma's 1931 Blue Sky Law."0 The
decision in Dunham v. Chemical Bank &4 Trust Co."1 decided under
6590 Utah 212, 58 P.2d 18 (1936).
"Id. at 23. (Emphasis added.)
" Holland v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 151 Colo. 69, 376 P.2d 162 (1962).
"SNichols v. Yandre, 151 Fla. 87, 90 So. 2d 157, 160 (1942). (Emphasis added.) See
also Scott v. Novick, 172 So. 2d 516 (Fla. App. 1965).
"'Westerhaver v. Dunnavant, 225 Ala. 400, 143 So. 823 (1932).
°Cofflield v. Ernsberger, 187 Okla. 79, 101 P.2d 251 (1940).
7' 180 Okla. 534, 71 P.2d 468 (1937).
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the 1921 Oklahoma Blue Sky Law is no longer controlling law in
this area.'
5. Official Capacity as Basis for Liability Absolute liability of a
corporate officer or director based solely on his official capacity with
the selling corporation is the next logical extension of peripheral
liability. Such an extension would result in the liability of every
officer and director of a corporation participating in an illegal sale.
In view of the extent to which courts have gone to find participation
by an officer-director, it should come as no surprise that some courts
have taken the final step and have held officers and directors liable to
purchasers for sales of unregistered securities seemingly on the sole
basis of the officer's or director's official connection with the issuing
corporation. 3
Attention may again be called to the case of Harper v. Tri-State
Motors, Inc.,"4 in which the Utah court, though purporting to require
participation, indicated that the mere signing of a stock certificate in
an official capacity may be sufficient participation to render an officer
liable. The decision buttressed a prior decision of the Utah court, But-
tery v. Guaranteed Sec. Co.," which, like the Harper case, was based
upon a Utah Blue Sky Law provision making any sale in violation of
the law void and providing that every officer and director of any
investment company, and every dealer or agent would be liable to
the purchaser in a civil action for the purchase price paid." While
paying lip service to the proposition that the clause would not be ap-
plied indiscriminately to all directors of a corporation, the court
nevertheless said in speaking about the statute:
It relates . . . only to officers, directors and agents who are such at
the time of the transaction, the officers and directors being charged
with the duty of seeing to it that their corporation has complied with
the law . . . and the agent as well as the officers and directors who sell
securities being charged with the duty of knowing that such sale has
been authorized by the commission and only to those who participate
directly or indirectly in the sale." . . . [I]t was intended that good faith
concerning that matter should be no defense. Finally, if the liability
be limited to those who actually participated, either directly or in-
72 It is doubtful too that the Oklahoma court would again refuse to hold a corporation
liable as an agent as it did in Braniff v. Cofflield, 199 Okla. 604, 190 P.2d 815 (1947).
" "Crawford was an officer and director of the corporation, and even if he had not
participated in negotiating the particular sale to Smith, his official relation to the corpora-
tion and his signing the stock certificate rendered him liable if the stock was sold in violation
of any proviison of the law." Smith v. Crawford, 228 Ky. 420, 15 S.W.2d 249, 250 (Civ.
App. 1929).
7490 Utah 212, 58 P.2d 18 (1936).
'78 Utah 39, 300 P. 1040 (1931).7
1Utah Spec. Sess. Laws 1919, ch. 17, § 24.7 7 Buttery v. Guaranteed Sec. Co., 78 Utah 39, 300 P. 1040, 1044 (1931).
1966]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
directly, in the unlawful sale, no injustice or unmerited hardship can
result, for the honest and pure in heart can always avoid liability by the
simple expedient of not taking part in a sale ......
The matters stated by the Utah Supreme Court in the Buttery case
were only dicta insofar as the officers and directors were concerned
since the plaintiff did not allege that anyone had participated in the
sale other than the selling agent. Certainly, however, the Harper case
clearly shows the extent to which that court will apply the participa-
tion doctrine.
There would seem to be some validity in the argument that even
those states which purport to hold officers and directors liable solely
by virtue of their official capacity nevertheless still require some
affirmative act on the part of the officer or director. However, in
regard to a particular sale, such affirmative act may be nothing more
than the formalistic signing of the stock certificate" or voting on
matters relating to such illegal sale.8"
The Illinois court has probably gone further than any other in
holding directors "absolutely" liable on the sale of an unregistered
security. The Illinois statute states that the "seller of the securi-
ties so sold, the officers and directors of seller, and each and every
solicitor, agent or broker of or for such seller, who knowingly per-
formed any act or in any way furthered such sale, shall be jointly
and severally liable . . ... The court in construing this statute noted:
"After carefully reconsidering the matter we are now convinced
that the legislature contemplated that liability should attach to all
who were directors of a corporation when its stock was sold in viola-
tion of the said law, and had knowledge or were chargeable with
knowledge of such sale."2
The court found that the liability of an officer or director was just as
absolute as that of the seller of the unregistered security regardless
of the officer's or director's connection with such sale. As to the re-
quirement of knowledge presented by the statute, the court stated,
"[W]e know of no principle of law that affords a basis for construing
the statute otherwise than that the director is liable whether he par-




78McWhirter v. Holmes, 49 Ga. App. 536, 176 S.E. 153 (Ga. Civ. App. 1934); Smith
v. Crawford, 228 Ky. 420, 15 S.W.2d 249 (Civ. App. 1929).
8°Westerhaver v. Dunnavant, 225 Ala. 400, 143 So. 823 (1932).81 SMITH-HURD ILL. STAT. ANN. art. 121-1/2, § 132(1) (1935).




III. RELATED CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER FEDERAL SECURITIES ACTS"4
A. Securities Act Of 1933
The principal purpose of this inquiry is to discover the various
forms of vicarious liability, so to speak, of parties only tangentially
involved in the sale of securities under state blue sky laws. However,
no such discussion can be complete without at least cursory mention
of the liability which an issuer, or the officers or directors thereof
may incur under the federal securities acts. This discussion is intended
only to illustrate the fact that where liability is found to exist under
one or more state blue sky provisions, liability probably has been
incurred by the selling parties and/or their officers, directors or agents
under the federal laws as well.
In the case of Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis,8 5 stock reg-
istered in Utah was sold to one Nevada resident destroying the intra-
state exemption. " The vice president of the company and a director
presided over and participated in the board of directors meeting
where the sale of stock and disposition of the proceeds was discussed
and authorized. The vice president, who owned one-third of the
total stock of the selling company, signed the stock certificate. The
court held that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury find-
ing that the vice president was a "controlling person"87 and there-
fore was liable to the same extent as would be the seller under section
12 of the 1933 Act. 8
B. Securities Exchange Act Of 1934
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193488 and rule
10 (b) (5)98 issued thereunder have been used increasingly to reach the
corporate insider who through various practices promotes sales in
violation of the federal securities acts. Illustrative of these holdings
as they relate to officer-director liability is the statement of the court
in Freed v. Szabo Food Serv., Inc.:
Action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b) (5) will lie against third
parties in the absence of privity. New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer,
84 For related articles in this Symposium, see the table of contents.
8'5251 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1957).
8648 Stat. 74, § 3(a) (11); 15 U.S.C. 77c (1963).
8748 Stat. 74, § 15; 15 U.S.C. 77o (1963).
88 See also the following cases finding officers and directors liable under § 12 through
the use of the "control" provisions of § 15 of the act: Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp.
59 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Bailey v. Huntington Sec. Co., 35 F.R.D. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
Schamber v. Aaberg, 186 F. Supp. 52 (D. Colo. 1960); Miller v. Hano, 8 F.R.D. 67
(E.D. Pa. 1947).
8948 Star. 881, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1963).
8" 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)-5 (1964).
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CCH Fed.Sec.L.R., Sec. 91, 280 at p. 94, 245 (1963) ... Were this not
the rule, corporate officers and directors would possess an immunity
from the consequences of their fraud under Section 10(b) or Rule
10(b) (5) which outsiders who may have collaborated with them in
defrauding the corporation would not possess."
A full discussion of the problems inherent in the use of section 10 (b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10(b) (5) is, of
course, beyond the scope of this discussion; however, the above quo-
tation will illustrate the tone of the court decisions in this area.
In view of the enlarging and expanding concepts imposing liability
on officers, directors and any one remotely connected with the sale
of an illegal security, it is somewhat refreshing to find the federal
district court in Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Bocock,5 ' quoting with approval the language in Royal Air Proper-
ties, Inc. v. Smith: "The purposes of the Securities Exchange Act are
to protect the innocent investor, not one who loses his innocence and
then waits to see how his investment turns out before he decides to in-
voke the provisions of the Act.""
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Implicit but unexpressed in both "agent" cases and those involv-
ing officers and directors is the concept of "private enforcement" of
the blue sky laws. No state, nor the federal government for that
matter, is willing to expend sufficient funds to finance a truly rig-
orous enforcement of the security acts. By expanding the concept of
civil liability and persons liable for "illegal" security sales, legislatures
and the courts seek to provide incentive for "private enforcement" of
the law rather than to provide the funds required for public enforce-
ment. Possible civil liability is doubtlessly a meaningful deterrent
provided those who may become liable know of its existence.
One is tempted to draw broad conclusions and sweeping generaliza-
tions from the relatively few reported cases involving liability of
parties peripherally involved in illegal security transaction. Yet cau-
tion is advised in view of the amazingly few cases reported in this
area. Seemingly expansive civil liability should provide a most lucra-
1 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 91,317; 91,363 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
92See also Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953); Miller v. Bargain City,
U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F.
Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); New Park Mining Co. v. Cramer, CCH FED. SEc. L. REp.
91,280 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
92247 F. Supp. 373, 377 (S.D. Tex. 1965).
94 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962). (Emphasis added.) For a similar court expression see




tive and profitable field of litigation for the more "knowing" inves-
tor, though certainly the blue sky laws were not enacted for his
benefit. The reasons for the paucity of cases becomes an interesting
exercise in speculation and conjecture. Settlement is the first and
most obvious conclusion; non-availability of a sufficiently wealthy
defendant is another. One would probably like to conclude that cor-
porate officials and attorneys are so well versed in modern security
practices that such illegal security sales no longer arise. Another
possible answer is that the general gambling aura which early per-
vaded stock investments has so taken the public mind that the gen-
eral investing public seldom thinks of attempting to "recoup" an
investment loss. Rather, the public feels they have made their bet,
the wheel has spun, and the ball has stopped on the wrong number.
"Welshing on a bet" still is not considered very honorable. Lack of
knowledge of the available remedies on the part of the small investor
well may play some part. Contributing also may be the relative
smallness of most investments as compared to the high costs of re-
coupment-attorneys fees, trial and appellate court costs. Though
most blue sky laws permit interest, attorneys fees and costs in addi-
tion to original investment (and in some instances punitive type
damages), these spoils are only for the victor; and the battle must
be financed before it can be won. In reality all these factors, and
probably more, contribute to the scarcity of decisions in this area. The
relatively few decisions, taking into consideration their respective
"ages", remain the only proven guideposts.
A. Agents
Aside from situations involving actual fraud, deceit or "conspir-
acy by silence," one is prone to question the wisdom of the extension
of liability announced in the Brown case." However, it is very likely
that this new pronouncement expanding the number of parties civ-
illy liable will be followed by other courts. Anybody forming a link
in the chain by which a sale is negotiated, made, or concluded may be
liable to the purchaser of a security sold in violation of blue sky pro-
visions. Questions of profit, knowledge, authority, equal opportunity
and good faith will not benefit the defense. The seller (to his amaze-
ment) may find that he had many "agents" working for him though
without his knowledge-much less his authorization.
Although the Texas court rejects the joint-venture theory of
defense where the negotiations for the sale of the securities were car-
ried out as part of the creation of the business entity, one must hope,
"Brown v. Cole, 155 Tex. 624, 291 S.W.2d 704 (1956).
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for the sake of the business community, that a better rule will develop
which will not impose liability as between those who stand on equal
footing at the inception of the business venture. Such a rule should
still permit recovery by our typical duped and innocent widow and
children yet deny recovery where the investor has, or should have, a
reasonable amount of business acumen and a chance to investigate (if
not in fact participate in) the formative venture. Hope springs anew
with the Fifth Circuit's recitation from the Royal Air Properties
case" that the purpose of the securities acts is to protect the inno-
cent, not to provide a "heads I win; tails you lose" cinch bet for the
wily. Hopefully then in this area of "agent" liability, while the courts
expand the concept of who is an agent, they will at the same time
limit the parties who may take advantage of the extended liability.
B. Officers And Directors
It is difficult to discern a development or trend in officer-director
cases. Most of the cases are of relatively ancient vintage, particularly
the more stringent holdings which, like the Illinois decision in
Goelitz v. Lathrop," border on the verge of absolute liability based
solely upon official capacity. The dates of these cases may be signifi-
cant, coming in the early to middle 1930's. Conceivably, the general
disenchantment of that day with corporate securities and affairs in
general may in part account for the harsh treatment of corporate
officers and directors at the hands of the courts.
Encouraging are the later cases which deny recovery where the
officer and/or director has participated in an official capacity not di-
rectly connected with the transaction and then only after the sale has
been negotiated and, for all practical purposes, completed."9 It offends
one's inherent sense of justice to hold a president liable for an "illegal"
sale where his only connection with the transaction was signing one
stock certificate (among many) as is his duty under most corporate
by-laws and state corporation acts. If one agrees with the Kansas
court in the Daniels case9 that the plaintiff, after payment of the
96 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962).
97 286 Ill. App. 248, 3 N.E.2d 305 (1936). See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
9 Scott v. Novick, 172 So.2d 516 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965). See note 68 supra and accom-
panying text. Holland v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 151 Colo. 69, 376 P.2d 162
(1962). See note 67 supra and accompanying text. Willis v. Spring Canyon Copper Co., 4
Utah 2d 211, 291 P.2d 878 (1956). See notes 56 and 57 supra and accompanying text.
But cf. Spears v. Lawrence Sec., Inc., 399 P.2d 348 (1965). See note 64 supra and accom-
panying text. Miller v. Griffith, 28 Ohio App. 2d 278, 196 N.E. 154 (C.P. 1961). See note
62 supra and accompanying text. Ferar v. Hall, 330 Mich. 214, 47 N.W.2d 79 (1951). See
note 53 supra and accompanying text.




purchase price, could not fully enjoy her new status as a shareholder
without a certificate, then certainly the corporate president could be
forced (through appropriate court action) to sign and issue a certifi-
cate for such shares. It should not follow that by performing such an
act after a sale made by a third party, the president of the corpora-
tion should become liable to the purchaser of the security.
The conflicting interests of society in protecting the innocent from
the unscrupulous on the one hand and in preserving a fundamental
advantage of what has become an essential business format on the
other, should have produced a more impressive sound than the whim-
per heard to date. The concept of no personal liability for corporate
officers acting in their official capacity is an ingrained part of Amer-
ican business thinking today. The clash of this concept with society's
inherent desire to protect the unwary should have produced far more
decisions than the records reveal. In both the officer-director area and
the agency area the intensity and complexity of the battle may never-
theless be seen even in the few decisions revealed by the cases to date.
It is hoped that neither institution should be made the victim of the
other. Neither the blue sky laws nor the security acts should be
allowed to become an investor's "hedge"; yet these laws must still be
construed broadly enough to permit the innocent to recover. Mr.
Plunger has paid his money and with open eyes taken his chance; he
should be required to abide it. Mrs. Widow has taken hers with eyes
closed and should be allowed to rescind it. Certainly the law should
be wise enough and flexible enough to accommodate both concepts.
1966]
